St. John's Law Review
Volume 90
Number 1 Volume 90, Spring 2016, Number 1

Article 5

The Preclusion of § 1983 Claims by the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act Following Hildebrand v. Allegheny County
Erin L. Donnelly

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

FINAL_DONNELLY

8/25/2016 11:59 AM

NOTES
THE PRECLUSION OF § 1983 CLAIMS BY
THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT FOLLOWING
HILDEBRAND V. ALLEGHENY COUNTY
ERIN L. DONNELLY†
INTRODUCTION
The aging of the Baby Boomer generation, which completed
its entry into the workforce in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
combined with the economic recession has resulted in older
workers trying to remain in the American workforce. Baby
Boomers are both retiring later and reentering the workforce
after retiring.1 Due to the aging workplace, the problem of age
discrimination has become increasingly prevalent. One of the
pitfalls of the aging workforce is the lack of judicial resources to
accommodate for the numerous age discrimination claims.
Because of this growing problem, the United States Circuit
Courts of Appeals have explored the issue of which remedies are
available to these aggrieved workers.
In 1967, Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”) to combat the growing problem of age
discrimination in the workplace.2 The ADEA is designed “to
promote employment of older persons based on their ability
rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in
employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting

†
Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., cum laude, 2016, St. John’s
University School of Law; B.A. 2013, Boston College.
1
Katherine Peralta, Baby Boomers Turn On, Tune In, but Don’t Drop Out, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Oct. 3, 2014, 3:02 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/
blogs/data-mine/2014/10/03/older-adults-staying-in-labor-force-longer-means-younge
r-ones-participating-less.
2
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat.
602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012)).
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problems arising from the impact of age on employment.”3
Workers are also protected from discrimination in the workplace
by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.4 Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
creates a private right of action through which citizens can bring
claims for equal protection violations. Thus, workers have been
asserting their age-based discrimination claims under either both
the ADEA and § 1983 or simply under § 1983.5 Recently, there
has been a split of authority among the circuit courts as to
whether federal age discrimination claims by state or local
government workers may be brought only under the ADEA as
opposed to both the ADEA and § 1983.
Prior to 2012, all of the Circuit Courts of Appeals that had
considered whether the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for agebased discrimination concluded that the ADEA precludes
plaintiffs from bringing concurrent claims of equal protection
violations under § 1983.6 The First, Ninth, Tenth, and District of
Columbia Circuits followed the analysis presented by the Fourth
Circuit in the then-leading case, Zombro v. Baltimore City Police
Department.7 There, the court analyzed the comprehensive
remedial scheme of the ADEA and concluded that age-based
discrimination claims can not concurrently be brought under
§ 1983 because the remedial scheme implied preclusion of

3

Id. § 621(b).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides, in pertinent part, “No State
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
5
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress[.]
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
6
See Ahlmeyer v. Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 555 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2009);
Tapia-Tapia v. Potter, 322 F.3d 742 (1st Cir. 2003); Migneault v. Peck, 158 F.3d
1131 (10th Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, sub nom. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
N.M. v. Migneault, 528 U.S. 1110 (2000); Lafleur v. Tex. Dep’t of Health, 126 F.3d
758 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); Chennareddy v. Bowsher, 935 F.2d 315 (D.C. Cir.
1991); Zombro v. Balt. City Police Dep’t, 868 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1989).
7
See 868 F.2d 1364.
4
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§ 1983.8 The only circuit to have concluded otherwise based its
holding on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee.9
In 2009, the Supreme Court examined whether plaintiffs
claiming sexual harassment, in violation of Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972,10 could bring concurrent claims
under § 1983 for violations of the Equal Protection Clause.11 The
Court examined the nature and extent of the remedial scheme of
Title IX and found that a plaintiff would not be circumventing
procedural requirements by bringing a concurrent § 1983 claim.12
In assessing the legislative intent of Title IX, the Court noted
there was essentially no remedial scheme that would have
implied preclusion of § 1983 claims by Title IX.13 The Court also
reasoned that Congress did not intend for Title IX to be the
exclusive means of remedying gender discrimination in schools.14
Following Fitzgerald, two circuit courts addressed the
exclusivity of the ADEA as a remedy for age discrimination in the
workplace—the Seventh Circuit in Levin v. Madigan15 and the
Third Circuit in Hildebrand v. Allegheny County.16 The Seventh
Circuit was the first circuit court to explore the issue of whether
plaintiffs could bring age-based discrimination claims under both
the ADEA and § 1983 as opposed to under only the ADEA in light
of the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Fitzgerald. In
Levin, the Seventh Circuit equated the ADEA to Title IX to find
that plaintiffs can bring age-based discrimination claims under
both the ADEA and § 1983.17
In 2014, the Third Circuit confronted the issue of ADEA
exclusivity in Hildebrand v. Allegheny County.18 The court held
that the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age discrimination
claims and thus precludes aggrieved workers from bringing agebased discrimination claims under the Equal Protection Clause
8

See infra Part II.A.
See 555 U.S. 246 (2009).
10
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
11
See Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. 246; infra Part II.B.
12
Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 255–56.
13
Id. at 258–59.
14
Id. at 258.
15
692 F.3d 607 (2012).
16
757 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1398 (2015); see also infra
Part II.C.
17
See generally Levin, 692 F.3d 607.
18
757 F.3d 99.
9
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through § 1983.19 As a result, the plaintiff was allowed to
maintain his age discrimination claim under the ADEA but not
under § 1983.20 In so holding, the Third Circuit reaffirmed the
decisions of six of its sister circuit courts, which have held that
plaintiffs cannot bring both ADEA and § 1983 claims. The Third
Circuit is the first federal appellate court to hold that the ADEA
precludes a plaintiff from bringing concurrent claims under
§ 1983 following the Supreme Court’s decision in Fitzgerald.
This Note maintains that the Supreme Court should resolve
the circuit split by affirming the Hildebrand court’s decision.
Part I of this Note discusses the background of the ADEA and
§ 1983, including each legislation’s purpose, legislative history,
and provisions. Part I concludes with a discussion of the doctrine
of implied preclusion. Part II presents the circuit split by
discussing the way the courts have analyzed this issue prior to
Fitzgerald and how subsequent courts have decided the issue in
light of Fitzgerald. Part III asserts that the ADEA precludes
equal protection claims through § 1983 because of its
comprehensive remedial scheme.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967

1.

Purpose

According to its preamble, the purpose of the ADEA is “to
promote employment of older persons based on their ability
rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in
employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of
meeting problems arising from the impact of age on
employment.”21 The stated purposes of the enactment are part of
the ultimate goal of the ADEA, which is “to shift focus away from
chronological age and age-related barriers and to insist on
individual assessments of ability and merit in making
employment decisions.”22

19

Id. at 102.
Id.
21
29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2012).
22
Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older Workers, Disparate Impact, and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 FLA. L. REV. 229, 235 (1990).
20
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Key Provisions

The ADEA applies to workers above the age of forty who
have been discriminated against by their employers on the basis
of age.23 The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to make
employment decisions on the basis of age concerning hiring,
When an
discharging, training, wages, and classifying.24
employee seeks to bring a discrimination claim against an
employer, there are certain administrative remedies that the
employee must first exhaust.25 First, the employee must file a
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) before commencing a civil action.26 The ADEA requires
that an employee file the discrimination charge within 180 days
from the date the alleged discrimination occurred.27 Next, the
EEOC will notify all named parties and attempt to eliminate the
discrimination “by informal methods of conciliation, conference,
and persuasion.”28 The worker must then wait sixty days from
the date of filing the charge before commencing a civil action
against the employer.29 If an employer is found liable under the
ADEA, the court may compel the employer to employ, reinstate
or promote the aggrieved employee.30 Further, the employer may
be liable for unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime
compensation.31 Finally, if the employer “willful[ly] violat[es]”
the ADEA, the employer may be subject to liquidated damages,
which is equal to the amount of actual damages.32

23

29 U.S.C. § 631(a).
Id. § 623(a).
25
Id. § 626(d).
26
Id. § 626(d)(1). The transfer of function from the Secretary of Labor to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was a result of the 1978 amendments
to the ADEA. JOSEPH E. KALET, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 9 (2d
ed. 1990); Reorganization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-17, 91 Stat. 29 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 901–912 (2012)).
27
29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1). The charge must be filed within 300 days in states that
have their own administrative agencies for handling discrimination claims. Id.
28
Id. § 626(d)(2).
29
Id. § 626(d)(1).
30
Id. § 626(b).
31
Id.
32
Id.
24
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Legislative History

The issue of age discrimination in the workplace did not
garner congressional attention until discussions surrounding the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.33 During the debates
regarding the employment provision of the Act, Title VII,
Congress considered including age among the groups that would
be protected.34 As opposed to the “long, tumultuous, and at times
violent civil rights struggle that captured the public’s attention”
with regard to race, which led to the need for the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, age was not a widespread problem that needed to be
addressed at the time.35 Thus, Congress resolved to have the
Secretary of Labor study age discrimination in employment and
report any findings.36
Within one year, Secretary Willard Wirtz reported to
Congress his finding that there was widespread age
discrimination in the workplace that needed to be addressed.37
His report raised concerns about arbitrary age discrimination
based on misconceptions about the abilities of older workers as
opposed to discrimination based on the actual abilities of older
workers.38 This report became the “catalyst for swift passage of
the ADEA.”39 In 1966, Congress called for legislative proposals
from the Secretary of Labor, which was quickly followed by a
draft bill in 1967.40 President Lyndon B. Johnson subsequently

33
See Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
34
110 CONG. REC. 2596–99, 9911–13 (1964).
35
Evan H. Pontz, Comment, What a Difference ADEA Makes: Why Disparate
Impact Theory Should Not Apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 74
N.C. L. REV. 267, 298 (1995).
36
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 241, 265. The
Secretary was directed to “make a full and complete study of the factors which might
tend to result in discrimination in employment because of age and of the
consequences of such discrimination on the economy and individuals affected.” Id.
37
Pontz, supra note 35, at 299–300 (citing WILLARD WIRTZ, U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT,
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER § 715 OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, H.R. REP. No. 805 (1965)).
38
Pontz, supra note 35, at 299.
39
Kaminshine, supra note 22, at 235.
40
KALET, supra note 26, at 1–2.
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endorsed the bill in his Older Americans Message where he
called for an “end [to] arbitrary age limits on hiring.”41 The
ADEA was enacted later that year.42
Although the ADEA’s enactment arose out of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the drafters realized that the “mere inclusion of the
term ‘age’ into Title VII” would be inadequate since age was not
an immutable characteristic, unlike race and sex.43 The drafters
did, however, mirror Title VII’s enforcement scheme and proof
considerations. Since Title VII lacked a remedial scheme, the
drafters modeled the remedial scheme of the ADEA after that of
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 193844 (“FLSA”). Thus, the
ADEA is a hybrid of Title VII and the FLSA.45
4.

ADEA’s Relation to FLSA and Title VII

Although the stimulus for the enactment of the ADEA can be
attributed to the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the impetuses behind the two acts are incongruent. Title
VII was passed in direct response to the Civil Rights Movement,
which was the result of a long history of discrimination against
African Americans.46 Title VII of the Act was enacted to ensure
there was no discrimination against African Americans in the
workplace. The passage of the ADEA, however, resulted from the
discussion of whether age should be a class protected from
discrimination in the workplace.47 When Congress decided that
age did not deserve the same protection as a class of people who
had long faced discrimination in the United States, it resolved to
enact the ADEA to protect against arbitrary age discrimination
in the workplace.48
Since Title VII was a statute addressing discrimination in
the workplace, the ADEA was modeled after it.49 Both statutes
are largely identical in their purpose and substantive
provisions.50 The main difference between the ADEA and Title
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

113 CONG. REC. 34,743–44 (1967).
KALET, supra note 26, at 2.
Id.
Id. at 2–3.
Id.; see infra Part I.A.4.
Pontz, supra note 35.
Id.
See supra Part I.A.1.
Pontz, supra note 35, at 289.
Id.
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VII, however, is the varied remedial provisions.51 In 1991,
Congress amended Title VII to include the availability of
compensatory damages for pain and suffering.52 The ADEA
included no such amendment, which further exemplifies the lack
of congressional intent for these two statutes to be interpreted in
the same way.53
The remedial provisions of the ADEA most closely resemble
those of the FLSA.54 The FLSA sets forth employment rules
concerning minimum wages, maximum hours, and overtime
The ADEA’s remedial scheme incorporates several
pay.55
enforcement provisions of the FLSA by direct reference to the
FLSA.56 Specifically, it provides that the rights created by the
ADEA are to be “enforced in accordance with the powers,
remedies, and procedures provided in [the specified sections of
the ADEA].”57
In terms of exclusivity, courts have held that Title VII does
not preclude a plaintiff from bringing claims under § 1983,58
whereas courts have held that the FLSA does preclude plaintiffs
from bringing concurrent claims through § 1983.59
B.

42 U.S.C. § 1983: History, General Provisions, and Scope of
Actions

Section 1983 provides a remedy for anyone who has been
subjected to the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” by any person
who acts “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of

51

See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978).
David C. Miller, Alone in Its Field: Judicial Trend To Hold That the ADEA
Preempts § 1983 in Age Discrimination in Employment Claims, 29 STETSON L. REV.
573, 586 (2000).
53
Id. at 586–87.
54
KALET, supra note 26, at 2–3.
55
29 U.S.C. §§ 206–207 (2012).
56
Miller, supra note 53, at 585.
57
29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
58
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49 (1974).
59
Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 1027, 1029 (N.D. Cal.
1972).
52
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Columbia.”60 The two essential elements of a claim under § 1983
are (1) the deprivation of a federal right (2) by someone acting
“under color of” state law.61
Section 1983 was originally enacted as § 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 in order to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments.62
Due to the “longstanding congressional recognition that a federal
right is of little practical value without a corresponding remedy
for violation of that right,” § 1983 was necessary to combat the
racism that still existed after the passage of the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.63 The establishment of
a federal cause of action for violations of one’s constitutional
rights through § 1983 was essential for the protection of African
Americans from members of the Ku Klux Klan.64
Section 1983 actions are subject to a complex set of rules.65
Section 1983 does not provide any substantive rights; it merely
provides a cause of action when there has been a deprivation of
one’s federal or constitutional rights.66 Despite § 1983’s broad
language, courts have narrowed its availability to those seeking
to bring claims under it.67 Restrictions that have been imposed
on § 1983 actions include, but are not limited to, qualified
immunity and express or implied preclusion.68
In addition to naming the individual actors who committed
the alleged constitutional violation under § 1983, plaintiffs often
bring in the municipal entity as a defendant.69 To prove one’s
claim against the municipal entity, the plaintiff must
demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there was
a municipal custom or policy to which the deprivation of a federal

60

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
Id.
62
Jacob E. Meyer, Note, “Drive-By Jurisdictional Rulings”: The Procedural
Nature of Comprehensive-Remedial-Scheme Preclusion in § 1983 Claims, 42 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 415, 419 (2009).
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
See 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3573.2 (3d ed. 2016).
66
Meyer, supra note 62, at 420–21.
67
Id. at 421–22.
68
Id. at 422.
69
See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978) (holding that
municipal corporations may be named in a § 1983 litigation).
61
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right can be attributed.70 There is much difficulty associated
with proving this type of claim, however. The custom or practice
must have been “so well settled and widespread that the
policymaking officials of the municipality can be said to have
either actual or constructive knowledge of it yet did nothing to
end the practice.”71 The high standard makes it difficult for
plaintiffs to prove their case under the custom or practice
theory.72
C.

Implied Preclusion Doctrine

The Supreme Court has set forth guidelines that should be
followed in determining when a federal statute should be
considered the exclusive remedy for a wrong that another statute
also addresses. The implied preclusion doctrine is based upon
the idea that a statute that contains a “comprehensive remedial
scheme signals congressional intent to limit enforcement of the
federal right to the mechanisms contained within the remedial
scheme.”73 Statutes that have precluded § 1983 causes of action
include, but are not limited to, the Federal Water Pollution

70
MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & KATHRYN R. URBONYA, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 6
(2d ed. 2008), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sec19832.pdf/
$file/sec19832.pdf.
71
Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871 F.2d 1151, 1156 (1st Cir. 1989).
72
See Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that the
plaintiff submitted insufficient evidence to create a triable issue that the Houston
Southwest Gang Task Force was engaged in a pattern of unconstitutional searches
pursuant to a custom of the city based on reports of eleven warrantless entries into
residences); Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that
testimony by a fire chief that the practice of firefighters who wish to criticize
emergency operations remaining silent and complaining at a later time was one he
wanted to be followed was insufficient evidence of a pattern of free speech
violations). Cf. Sorlucco v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 971 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1992). In
Sorlucco, the court found that there was systemic gender discrimination, which is
subject to a more heightened standard of review than age discrimination, in the
NYPD after the plaintiff introduced evidence of the NYPD’s inadequate
investigation into the plaintiff’s complaint, expert testimony that the department’s
investigation was negligent, and a statistical study regarding actions taken against
probationary officers, which demonstrated that 100% of female officers who were
disciplined were fired whereas only 63% of the male officers disciplined were fired.
Id. at 871–73. The court even reasoned that the statistical study by itself would have
been insufficient to establish municipal liability. Id. at 872.
73
Meyer, supra note 62, at 417.
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Control Act74 (“FWPCA”), the Education of the Handicapped Act75
(“EHA”), the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the
Rehabilitation Act,76 and the Telecommunications Act.77
The first time the Supreme Court recognized the implied
preclusion doctrine was in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority
v. National Sea Clammers Ass’n.78 There, the plaintiffs brought a
private suit for damages under citizen-suit provisions of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (“FWPCA”) and the Marine
Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (“MPRSA”).79
Although the issue of § 1983 preclusion was not argued by the
parties, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs could not
bring their suits under § 1983 because the statutes at issue
precluded a remedy under § 1983.80
Justice Powell’s reasoning in Sea Clammers has been
referred to as the “comprehensiveness test.”81 This test focuses
on the remedial scheme that has been enacted as part of the
legislation to determine whether it is sufficiently comprehensive
to preclude a § 1983 claim.82 When legislation passes the
comprehensiveness test, it will usually result in preclusion.83
The inclination toward preclusion, however, is not definitive.84
The malleability of the test is an apt compromise between those
who argue against the implied preclusion doctrine. Thus, the
courts must determine exclusivity on a case-by-case basis.
In Sea Clammers, when the Court analyzed whether the
FWPCA and MPRSA preclude § 1983 claims, it acknowledged
that it needed to determine “whether Congress had foreclosed
private enforcement of [§ 1983] in the enactment itself.”85 The
74
See Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1
(1981).
75
See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
76
See Grey v. Wilburn, 270 F.3d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 2001).
77
See City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005).
78
453 U.S. 1.
79
Id. at 6.
80
Id. at 19–21.
81
Myron D. Rumeld, Note, Preclusion of Section 1983 Causes of Action by
Comprehensive Statutory Remedial Schemes, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1183, 1186 (1982).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 1190 (“Comprehensiveness should not emerge as a rigid test of
statutory interpretation, but as a flexible form of construction that assumes a
different role in and has a different impact on the adjudication of the various
remedial claims.”).
85
453 U.S. at 19.
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Court stated that “sufficiently comprehensive” remedial devices
“may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the
remedy of suits under § 1983.”86 Further, the Court reasoned
that the procedural requirements of a comprehensive
enforcement scheme cannot be bypassed by plaintiffs bringing a
claim directly under § 1983.87 The Court examined the statutory
remedies of the FWPCA and the MPRSA, including their citizensuit provisions that allow private citizens to sue for injunctive
relief under these statutes, and the specific procedures that
require plaintiffs to notify the Environmental Protection Agency,
the State, and any alleged violator before filing suit.88 Since the
statutes
set
forth
“quite
comprehensive
enforcement
mechanisms,” the Court held that Congress intended for the
statutes to “supplant any remedy that otherwise would be
available under § 1983.”89
In Smith v. Robinson, the Supreme Court similarly
examined whether a claim based on a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is precluded by
a federal statute.90 There, the plaintiff brought a claim alleging
denial of a free appropriate public education due to his handicap
under both the Education of the Handicapped Act (“EHA”) and
the Equal Protection Clause through § 1983.91 Since the Court
held that the claims were nearly identical, it used the implied
preclusion doctrine to determine whether the plaintiff could
bring his constitutional claims under both the EHA and § 1983.92
After its examination of the EHA’s statutory provisions and
legislative history, the Court concluded that “Congress intended
the EHA to be the exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff
may assert an equal protection claim.”93 The Court emphasized
that, when analyzing whether a statute precludes § 1983 claims,
the “crucial consideration is what Congress intended.”94
Congress’s intent is evidenced by its carefully tailored scheme,
which establishes procedures to ensure protection for
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Id. at 20.
Id.
Id. at 6, 14.
Id. at 20–21.
468 U.S. 992 (1984).
Id. at 994–95.
Id. at 1009.
Id.
Id. at 1012.
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handicapped children.95 The Court reasoned that allowing a
plaintiff to go directly to court with an equal protection claim
would “render superfluous most of the detailed procedural
Additionally, the
protections outlined in the statute.”96
legislative history indicated that Congress believed the EHA
would be the “most effective vehicle for protecting the
constitutional right.”97 Thus, the EHA is the exclusive avenue
through which plaintiffs asserting constitutional rights to a free
appropriate public education can bring their claims.
Following Smith, the Supreme Court examined another
federal statute to determine whether it precluded § 1983 claims
in Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams.98 There, the plaintiff sought
injunctive relief under the Telecommunications Act of 1996
(“TCA”) and money damages under § 1983.99
The Court
reinforced its holdings in previous cases that a defendant can
defeat the rebuttable presumption that a right is enforceable
under § 1983 by proving that Congress did not intend to allow a
§ 1983 remedy for a newly created statutory right.100 The Court
applied the implied preclusion doctrine, explaining that “such
congressional intent may be found directly in the statute creating
the right, or inferred from the statute’s creation of a
‘comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with
individual enforcement under § 1983.’ ”101 Since congressional
intent is the most important factor in the analysis,102 the Court
examined whether there was a “provision of an express, private
means of redress in the statute itself [because that] is ordinarily
an indication that Congress did not intend to leave open a more
expansive remedy under § 1983.”103 Because the TCA provided a
more restrictive private remedy for statutory violations, the
Court held it precluded plaintiffs from bringing § 1983 claims.104

95

Id. at 1010–11.
Id. at 1011.
97
Id. at 1013.
98
544 U.S. 113 (2005).
99
Id. at 118.
100
Id. at 120.
101
Id. (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997)).
102
Id. (quoting Smith, 468 U.S. at 1012).
103
Id. at 121.
104
Id. at 127.
96
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In its analysis of the exclusivity of the TCA, the Court
examined the enforcement scheme of the statute itself.
Generally, the TCA limits the regulation of the installation of
It requires local
facilities for wireless communications.105
governments to respond to requests for permits within a
reasonable amount of time and provide a written decision
supported by substantial evidence for any denials of permit
requests.106 Further, an individual adversely affected by a
government action or failure to act may file a suit after thirty
days.107 The remedy available to an individual, however, is
limited; a plaintiff is not entitled to compensatory damages or
attorney fees and costs. Since the TCA has a sufficiently
comprehensive scheme, and enforcement of it “would distort the
scheme of expedited judicial review and limited remedies,” the
Court held that the TCA precludes a plaintiff from resorting to
§ 1983 to bring his claims.108
The crux of the implied preclusion doctrine is looking at the
statutory language to determine congressional intent in the area
of exclusivity.109 The Supreme Court, in Sea Clammers and
Rancho Palos Verdes, looked at the language of the statute as the
primary source for determining whether Congress intended to
allow plaintiffs to bring concurrent § 1983 claims.110 The method
of statutory interpretation underlying the implied preclusion
doctrine provides:
“[I]t is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where
a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a
court must be chary of reading others into it.” In the absence of
strong indicia of a contrary congressional intent, we are
compelled to conclude that Congress provided precisely the
remedies it considered appropriate.111

105

Id. at 115–16.
Id. at 116.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 127.
109
See Meyer, supra note 62, at 423.
110
See Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U.S. 113; Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v.
Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
111
Meyer, supra note 62, at 423 (quoting Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979)).
106
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II. CIRCUIT SPLIT
A.

Pre-Fitzgerald Cases: Finding the ADEA Is the Exclusive
Remedy

The first time the issue of ADEA exclusivity was addressed
was by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
in Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Department.112 There, the
court held that the ADEA precludes age discrimination claims
from being brought under the Equal Protection Clause via
§ 1983.113 James Zombro, a forty-five year old police officer,
brought an equal protection claim in federal court alleging that
he was transferred to a different department within the police
force on the basis of his age.114 Zombro did not bring a claim
under the ADEA since he did not complete the necessary
administrative steps; it had been longer than six months since
the alleged discrimination, which was beyond the outer time
limit of filing a charge with the EEOC.115 The lower court
granted summary judgment in favor of the police department,
dismissing Zombro’s § 1983 claims, a decision which the Fourth
Circuit upheld.116 The Fourth Circuit held that Zombro could not
assert his age discrimination claims under § 1983 because the
ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age discrimination claims.117
To reach this conclusion, the court applied the implied
preclusion doctrine to the ADEA.118 It explained that “where
Congress has provided a comprehensive remedial framework,
such as the ADEA, a plaintiff is not relieved of the obligation to
follow that remedial procedure by claiming that state action
violative of the statutory scheme also violates the Fourteenth
Amendment.”119 Further, the court acknowledged that the only
time § 1983 claims would not be precluded would be if the statute
“manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual a choice
of pursuing independently rights under both the statutory

112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

868 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1369.
Id. at 1365.
Id. at 1366–67.
Id. at 1365.
Id. at 1369.
Id. at 1367.
Id. at 1368.
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scheme and some other applicable federal statute.”120 Even
though Zombro’s § 1983 claim was wholly predicated on a
violation of his constitutional rights, the court held that his claim
was the type that should have been brought under the ADEA.121
The Fourth Circuit applied the implied preclusion doctrine to
the ADEA by analyzing its language and purpose. First, it
engaged in an analysis of the ADEA’s comprehensive remedial
scheme.122 The court recognized that the purpose of the Act is to
“facilitate and encourage compliance through an informal process
of conciliation and mediation.”123 It acknowledged that the
ADEA’s “goal of compliance through mediation would be
discarded” if plaintiffs were allowed to circumvent the ADEA’s
administrative process.124 Additionally, the court looked at the
language and legislative history of the statute.125 The main
concern of the Fourth Circuit was that plaintiffs bringing age
discrimination claims under § 1983 would be bypassing the
comprehensive scheme created by Congress, thus making the
ADEA superfluous.126 Upon examining the ADEA, the court
concluded that it is a “precisely drawn, detailed statute, similar
to other statutory schemes which have been held to provide the
exclusive judicial remedy for a stated abuse.”127 Further, it
reasoned, the ADEA indicates congressional intent to foreclose
§ 1983 actions.128 The court found that it would be “implausible”
that Congress would have intended to permit plaintiffs to bypass
the ADEA’s comprehensive statutory scheme by preserving a
private cause of action under § 1983.129 Thus, the Fourth Circuit
held that the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age
discrimination claims.130
Following its discussion of the ADEA, the Fourth Circuit
turned to the issue of age discrimination claims being asserted
under the Fourteenth Amendment.131 The court acknowledged
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

Id. at 1367.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1366.
Id.
Id. at 1369.
Id. at 1366–67.
Id. at 1369.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1370–71.
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the Supreme Court’s statement that the elderly are not subject to
strict judicial scrutiny because they are not a suspect class.132
Because there was no discrimination based on race, sex, or
employees exercising their First Amendment rights, the Fourth
Circuit did not “intervene on constitutional grounds in the hiring,
discharge or promotion of public employees.”133
Following the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Zombro, the
United States Courts of Appeals for the First,134 Fifth,135 Ninth,136
Tenth,137 and D.C.138 Circuits have also held that the ADEA is the
exclusive remedy for age discrimination claims. Most of the
circuit courts applied the Zombro court’s reasoning to the facts of
their cases.139 The Ninth Circuit, however, also explored the
relationship of the ADEA to Title VII and the FLSA in Ahlmeyer
v. Nevada System of Higher Education.140 There, the plaintiff
sued her employer for denying her privileges of employment and
punishing her for actions for which younger employees were not
punished.141 The court found that the remedial provisions of the
ADEA, which are the most relevant to the subject of preclusion,
did not mirror those of Title VII;142 however, the differences
132
133

Id. at 1370 (citing Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1976)).
Id. at 1370–71 (quoting Clark v. Whiting, 607 F.2d 634, 638–39 (4th Cir.

1979)).
134
Tapia-Tapia v. Potter, 322 F.3d 742, 745 (1st Cir. 2003) (“The ADEA provides
the exclusive federal remedy for age discrimination in employment.”).
135
Lafleur v. Tex. Dep’t of Health, 126 F.3d 758, 760 (5th Cir. 1997) (per
curiam) (“[B]ecause Congress has enacted a statutory provision to confront age
discrimination in the work place via the ADEA, and based on this circuit’s opinion
that the ADEA is the sole remedy for persons who have been discriminated against
based on their age, we are compelled to hold that where a plaintiff asserts a claim of
age discrimination under § 1983 and where the facts alleged will not independently
support a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff’s age discrimination claim is preempted by the
ADEA.”).
136
Ahlmeyer v. Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 555 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2009)
(“Because the ADEA provides a comprehensive remedial scheme, it should be read
as precluding § 1983 actions in the area of age discrimination in employment.”).
137
Migneault v. Peck, 158 F.3d 1131, 1140 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[A]ge
discrimination claims brought under § 1983 are preempted by the ADEA.”), vacated
on other grounds, sub nom. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Migneault, 528 U.S.
1110 (2000).
138
Chennareddy v. Bowsher, 935 F.2d 315, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“It is
undisputed that the ADEA provides the exclusive remedy for a federal employee who
claims age discrimination.”).
139
See supra notes 113–24 and accompanying text.
140
555 F.3d at 1058–59.
141
Id. at 1054.
142
Id. at 1058–59.
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between the ADEA and Title VII do not merely lie in the statutes’
remedial provisions.
The court explained that while both
statutes are designed to eliminate discrimination, an individual’s
capacity to work may be affected by age, unlike race or other
protected groups within the scope of Title VII.143 The Ninth
Circuit concluded that the ADEA’s remedial scheme is more akin
to the enforcement provisions of the FLSA, which provide the
exclusive remedy for claims arising under its provisions, as both
statutes provide remedies such as reinstatement, backpay,
injunctive relief, declaratory judgment, and attorney fees.144
Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that because the ADEA’s
remedial scheme is different from that of Title VII, ADEA
plaintiffs, unlike Title VII plaintiffs, cannot bring concurrent
§ 1983 claims.145
B.

Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee: Holding That
Title IX Does Not Preclude § 1983 Claims

The Supreme Court’s most recent decision on exclusivity and
§ 1983 claims, Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee,
explored the implied preclusion doctrine via Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, which seeks to prohibit all
discrimination in schools based on sex.146 There, the plaintiffs,
an elementary school student and her parents, filed a § 1983
action against the school superintendent and school committee
claiming student-to-student sexual harassment in violation of
Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause.147 The Court applied
the implied preclusion doctrine to Title IX and concluded that the
plaintiffs could assert their § 1983 claims because Title IX did
not foreclose § 1983 causes of action.148
In its decision, the Court analyzed Title IX in light of the
previously decided implied preclusion cases, including Sea
Clammers, Smith v. Robinson, and Rancho Palos Verdes.149 The
Court began its discussion by indicating that it has “placed
primary emphasis on the nature and extent of [a] statute’s

143
144
145
146
147
148
149

Id. at 1059.
Id.
Id.
555 U.S. 246 (2009).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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remedial scheme” in determining whether it precludes the
enforcement of a federal right.150 In looking to the statutory
language, the Court concluded that the Title IX remedies of
withdrawing federal funds from a discriminatory actor and an
implied cause of action were far from the “ ‘unusually elaborate,’
‘carefully tailored,’ and ‘restrictive’ enforcement schemes of the
statutes at issue in Sea Clammers, Smith, and Rancho Palos
Verdes.”151 Title IX does not have any administrative exhaustion
requirements nor any notice provisions, which would be
circumvented should a parallel and concurrent § 1983 claim be
allowed.152 Thus, since there was no comprehensive remedial
scheme comparable to the schemes in the previous implied
preclusion cases, the Court concluded that Title IX was not
meant to be the exclusive means for addressing gender
discrimination in schools.153 Further, the Court reasoned that
“Congress modeled Title IX after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 . . . and passed Title IX with the explicit understanding
that it would be interpreted as Title VI was.”154
C.

Post-Fitzgerald Cases: Analyzing the ADEA in Light of the
Supreme Court’s Holding That Title IX Does Not Preclude
§ 1983 Claims

1.

Levin v. Madigan: Finding the ADEA Does Not Preclude
§ 1983 Claims

After Fitzgerald v. Barnstable, the first case to decide the
issue of whether the ADEA precludes § 1983 claims was Levin v.
Madigan.155 There, the Seventh Circuit found that § 1983 claims
based on age discrimination in the workplace are not precluded
by the ADEA.156

150

Id. at 253.
Id. at 255.
152
Id. at 255–56.
153
Id. at 258.
154
Id. Unlike the ADEA being modeled after Title VII and the FLSA, which
were not routinely interpreted as allowing § 1983 claims at the time of the ADEA’s
enactment, “[a]t the time of Title IX’s enactment in 1972, Title VI was routinely
interpreted to allow for parallel and concurrent § 1983 claims.” Id.
155
692 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2012).
156
Id. at 617.
151
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The plaintiff brought the action against his employer, a state
government organization, and his supervisors, asserting claims
under both the ADEA and the Equal Protection Clause through
§ 1983.157 To determine whether the § 1983 claim was precluded,
the Seventh Circuit recognized the implied preclusion doctrine
and that the Supreme Court “does not ‘lightly conclude that
Congress intended to preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy’ for
the deprivation of a federal right.”158 The court disagreed with
the Supreme Court in Fitzgerald and reasoned that “the most
It also
important consideration is congressional intent.”159
acknowledged that all of its sister courts have held that the
ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age discrimination claims.160
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit held that the ADEA did not
preclude § 1983 claims, despite the decision being “admittedly a
close call, especially in light of the conflicting decisions from our
sister circuits.”161
First, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that “[n]othing in the
text of the ADEA expressly precludes a § 1983 claim or addresses
constitutional rights.”162 Rather than concluding that Congress’s
silence was an indication of exclusivity, the court determined
that congressional silence was evidence that Congress did not
consider the ADEA’s exclusivity.163 The Seventh Circuit added
that a finding of preclusion requires “more . . . than a
comprehensive statutory scheme.”164 Thus, the ADEA’s remedial
scheme was not enough to imply that Congress intended the
ADEA to preclude § 1983 claims.
2.

Hildebrand v. Allegheny County: Finding the ADEA
Precludes § 1983 Claims

Two years after the Seventh Circuit’s anomalistic decision on
the issue of the ADEA’s preclusion of § 1983 claims, the Third
Circuit joined the discussion in Hildebrand v. Allegheny

157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

Id. at 609.
Id. at 613 (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012 (1984)).
Id. at 615.
Id. at 616.
Id. at 617.
Id.
Id. at 617–18.
Id. at 619.
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County.165 There, the court concluded that the ADEA is the
exclusive remedy for age discrimination claims and forecloses a
plaintiff from bringing an age discrimination suit under § 1983.166
Plaintiff Anthony Hildebrand was a detective for the
Allegheny County District Attorney’s Office for five years before
he was terminated in 2011.167 Hildebrand alleged that his
termination was based on an established practice in the District
Attorney’s Office of pushing older workers out of the
workplace.168 In 2009, Hildebrand was assigned to a new
supervisor who allegedly demoted him because of his age despite
Hildebrand’s satisfactory work performance.169 Upon learning of
his termination, Hildebrand filed an internal grievance; however,
his termination was upheld.170
In response to his termination, Hildebrand filed an Intake
Questionnaire with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) alleging age discrimination and
authorizing the EEOC to investigate his claim since he wanted to
file a charge of discrimination.171 Subsequently, the EEOC
issued a right-to-sue letter to Hildebrand.172 Hildebrand filed his
complaint asserting violations of the ADEA and the Equal
Protection Clause through § 1983.173 However, the district court
dismissed Hildebrand’s ADEA and § 1983 claims.174
On appeal, the Third Circuit was faced with the issue of
whether the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for claims of age
discrimination in the workplace.175 The court upheld the district
court’s dismissal of the ADEA claim because the ADEA is the
exclusive remedy for claims of age discrimination in
employment.176 In its analysis, the court relied on the implied

165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176

757 F.3d 99 (2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1398 (2015).
Id. at 102.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 102–03.
Id. at 103–04.
Id. at 104.
Id.
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preclusion doctrine. It reasoned that the main consideration in
the determination of whether a statutory enactment precludes a
§ 1983 claim is Congress’s intent.177
The Third Circuit explored Congress’s intent in its
enactment of the ADEA in light of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Fitzgerald and the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Levin.178 The
first consideration that the Third Circuit explored was
Fitzgerald’s reaffirmation of the Supreme Court’s consistent
holding that the “comprehensiveness of a statute’s remedial
scheme is the primary factor in determining congressional
intent.”179 The court reasoned that the Levin court wrongly
interpreted the Fitzgerald decision by holding that “Congress
must provide some ‘additional indication’ of its intent.”180 The
Third Circuit found that, for a statute to preclude § 1983 claims,
there need not be an outright manifestation of congressional
intent to preclude such claims.181 Rather, the Supreme Court’s
decision in Fitzgerald stands for the proposition that when there
are extensive procedural requirements or administrative
remedies in a statute, allowing a plaintiff to circumvent those
statutory requirements would be “inconsistent with Congress’
carefully tailored scheme.”182
The Third Circuit applied this analysis to the ADEA and
held that the ADEA’s comprehensive remedial scheme
sufficiently encompasses the Fourteenth Amendment’s concerns
of age discrimination in the workplace.183 The Third Circuit
reasoned that the ADEA provides a private right of action for
employees who are subjected to age discrimination in the
workplace once they exhaust the administrative remedies set out
by the statute, unlike Title IX.184 First, an employee must file a
charge of discrimination with the EEOC.185 Next, the EEOC
must “promptly seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice

177

Id. at 104–05.
Id. at 107–10.
179
Id. at 108 (citing Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 253
(2009) (“[W]e have placed primary emphasis on the nature and extent of [a] statute’s
remedial scheme.”)).
180
Id. at 109 (quoting Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 619 (7th Cir. 2012)).
181
Id. at 109.
182
Id. (quoting Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 255).
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
178
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by informal methods of conciliation, conference, and
persuasion.”186 Then, the employee may commence a lawsuit
against his employer sixty days after filing the charge if the
EEOC does not elect to file the suit to enforce the employee’s
claim.187 The Third Circuit determined that allowing a plaintiff
to sue directly under § 1983 and thereby circumvent this
comprehensive administrative process would undermine the
statutory scheme set out by Congress.188
The court also addressed the argument that the rights and
protections of the ADEA and the Equal Protection Clause are so
different that Congress could not have intended the ADEA to
preclude § 1983 claims.189 Since age discrimination claims only
receive rational basis review under the Equal Protection
Clause,190 the ADEA expands the protection of employees from
age discrimination in the workplace.191 The Third Circuit held
that the ADEA encompasses the protections afforded by the
Fourteenth Amendment since it prohibits arbitrary age
discrimination in employment.192
Finally, the Third Circuit explained that the fact that there
is a difference in potential defendants under the ADEA and
§ 1983 is not sufficient to conclude Congress intended to allow
both claims to proceed.193 The court reasoned that the limitations
set forth in the ADEA on potential defendants and on remedies is
even more evidence that Congress intended to specifically define
employees’ rights rather than allow them to circumvent the
administrative remedies of the ADEA.194 Thus, the Third Circuit
agreed with the majority of the United States Courts of Appeals
and concluded that Congress intended the ADEA to be the

186

29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2) (2012).
Hildebrand, 757 F.3d at 109.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (“States may
discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the
age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”).
191
Hildebrand, 757 F.3d at 109.
192
Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2012).
193
Hildebrand, 757 F.3d at 109–10.
194
Id. at 110.
187
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exclusive remedy for claims of age discrimination in the
workplace because § 1983 claims are “inconsistent with Congress’
carefully tailored scheme.”195
III. ANALYSIS
The majority of the United States Courts of Appeals have
consistently held that the ADEA precludes claims of age
discrimination in the workplace from being brought under
§ 1983.196 Only one circuit court has held that a litigant may
bring claims under both the ADEA and § 1983. The Supreme
Court’s decision in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee
was the impetus behind that court’s anomalistic decision. This
Note maintains, however, that the Seventh Circuit, in Levin v.
Madigan, misinterpreted the Court’s decision in Fitzgerald. The
Third Circuit’s decision in Hildebrand v. Allegheny County, on
the other hand, properly concluded that the ADEA is unlike Title
IX; therefore, the ADEA does preclude § 1983 claims.
First, the Third Circuit properly concluded that the ADEA
precludes § 1983 claims because it followed the implied
preclusion test set forth in Fitzgerald.197 The court in Hildebrand
observed that the crucial consideration in determining whether
someone can bring a concurrent statutory claim under § 1983 is
what Congress intended. The Third Circuit lifted the language of
the implied preclusion test directly from the Supreme Court’s
decision in Fitzgerald. Unlike the court in Levin, the Third
Circuit did not add any additional parameters to this test.198
When turning to the legislative history of the ADEA, it is
important to note that Congress enacted this statute after the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed. By not including age as a
class in the Civil Rights Act, Congress acknowledged the stark
195
Id. (quoting Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 255 (2009))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
196
See Hildebrand, 757 F.3d 99; Ahlmeyer v. Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 555
F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2009); Tapia-Tapia v. Potter, 322 F.3d 742 (1st Cir. 2003);
Migneault v. Peck, 158 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, sub
nom. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Migneault, 528 U.S. 1110 (2000); Lafleur v.
Tex. Dep’t of Health, 126 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); Chennareddy v.
Bowsher, 935 F.2d 315 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Zombro v. Balt. City Police Dep’t, 868 F.2d
1364 (4th Cir. 1989).
197
See supra Parts II.B, II.C.2.
198
The court in Levin v. Madigan improperly held that specific congressional
intent to preclude § 1983 claims must be proven to find that an enactment does not
preclude § 1983 claims. 692 F.3d 607, 619 (7th Cir. 2012).
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difference between race and age as protected classes.199 Since
there is no clear evidence that Congress did not intend to
preclude § 1983 claims, the next step is to look at the text of the
ADEA. The comprehensive remedial scheme set forth in the
ADEA is the best indicator of congressional intent. The ADEA
requires that a plaintiff file a claim of age discrimination with
the EEOC, that the EEOC try to remedy that discrimination
through mediation or other conciliatory measures, and that the
plaintiff wait sixty days to file a lawsuit from the date of filing a
charge of discrimination.200 These steps are intended to help find
a solution to age discrimination in the workplace aside from
immediately turning to costly and time-consuming litigation.
Allowing employees to sue separately under § 1983 allows them
to evade the ADEA’s carefully constructed remedial scheme by
having direct access to the federal courts. Congress’s scheme
would be greatly undermined if that were the case. Therefore, it
is apparent that Congress did not create this extensive statutory
framework for employees to simply ignore it.
Next, the Third Circuit’s conclusion that the ADEA
precludes § 1983 claims is proper when comparing the ADEA to
other statutes that the Supreme Court has already determined to
either preclude or not preclude such claims through the implied
preclusion doctrine. First, the Court in Sea Clammers held that
the FWPCA and the MPRSA preclude § 1983 claims. There, the
Court held that the elaborate enforcement provisions of the
statutes—such as citizen-suit provisions that allow private
citizens to sue for prospective relief, as well as notice provisions
requiring plaintiffs to notify the Environmental Protection
Agency, the State, and the alleged violator as a prerequisite to
filing suit—were indicative of congressional intent to preclude
§ 1983 claims.201 Further, the Court in Rancho Palos Verdes held
that the TCA precluded § 1983 claims.
There, the Court
reasoned that the TCA sets out a sufficiently comprehensive
scheme that indicated Congress did not intend for the TCA to
coexist with § 1983 claims.202 Similarly, the ADEA allows for a
private cause of action, has notice requirements, and mandates
199
200
201

See supra Part I.A.3–4.
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012).
Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1

(1981).
202

City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005).
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the satisfaction of other prerequisites before an employee can file
an age discrimination suit. Thus, the ADEA should similarly
preclude § 1983 claims.
Further, the Third Circuit properly held that claims of an
equal protection violation are similarly precluded by the ADEA.
This Note argues that the ADEA is similar to the EHA, which
the Court in Smith held was the exclusive avenue for bringing
constitutional claims.
The EHA was created to establish
procedures that would ensure the protection of handicapped
children from discrimination.
Similarly, the ADEA’s
enforcement scheme was created to protect older workers from
age discrimination. Since allowing a plaintiff to go directly to
court with an equal protection claim under the EHA would
“render superfluous most of [its] detailed procedural
protections,”203 allowing aggrieved employees to go directly to
court via § 1983 on the theory of an equal protection violation
would nullify the ADEA.
The Court in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee,
however, held that Title IX does not preclude claims from being
brought under § 1983. There, the Court concluded that the Title
IX remedies of withdrawing federal funds and an implied cause
of action were far from the types of schemes that the Court has
held to preclude § 1983 claims in the past.204 Title IX does not
have any administrative exhaustion requirements, nor any notice
provisions that would be circumvented by a plaintiff bringing a
§ 1983 claim. Additionally, Congress’s intent was clearer in the
enactment of Title IX to prove that it did not want Title IX to be
the exclusive remedy for claims of gender discrimination.
Congress modeled Title IX after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and passed Title IX with the understanding that it would be
interpreted in the same way as Title VI has been interpreted,
which is not to preclude § 1983 claims.205 Unlike Title IX, the
ADEA has notice provisions and administrative requirements
that must be exhausted before an employee may bring an age
discrimination suit. Thus, the ADEA is less like Title IX and
more akin to the statutes that the Supreme Court has held to
preclude § 1983 claims.

203
204
205

Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1011 (1984).
Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009).
See supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, allowing concurrent § 1983 claims with ADEA
claims creates the potential for a plaintiff to recover twice on the
same claim.206 If an aggrieved employee is allowed to bring
causes of action under both the ADEA and § 1983, a defendant
may be punished twice for a single discriminatory event. The
circuit split exacerbates this problem by allowing claimants to
bring their claims under both the ADEA and § 1983 in the
Seventh Circuit, whereas claimants in the First Circuit may only
bring their claims under the ADEA. This Note argues that
Congress, when it enacted the ADEA, did not intend for
employees who have been discriminated against on the basis of
age to be able to recover twice for the same injury. Further,
allowing both claims is detrimental to judicial economy.207 If all
of the Baby Boomers are able to bring both claims, judicial
resources will become tied up. If the ADEA does not preclude
§ 1983 claims, a plaintiff will conceivably be allowed to bring two
separate claims on the same argument. If an individual is
allowed to make two practically identical arguments based on
one discriminatory event, the judicial system will be less
efficient. Moreover, it is clear that Congress believes the ADEA
is the most efficient way of dealing with age discrimination in
employment claims due to its comprehensive remedial scheme.208
It is also important to note the ADEA’s relationship with the
FLSA. This Note maintains that the ADEA should not be
construed in the same manner as Title VII because of the
difference in their remedial provisions. Since the most important
part of a statute to look at during preemption analysis is its
remedial portion,209 the comparison between the ADEA and Title
VII’s remedial provisions is irrelevant. The ADEA’s remedial
provisions are, however, modeled after and incorporate the

206
See Lindsay Niehaus, The Title IX Problem: Is it Sufficiently Comprehensive
To Preclude § 1983 Actions?, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 499, 524 (2009) (arguing that
allowing concurrent Title IX and § 1983 claims allows a plaintiff to “take two bites at
the same apple” in spite of the Supreme Court’s decision in Fitzgerald).
207
See id. at 524–25.
208
See Smith, 468 U.S. at 1012–13 (holding that the legislative history of the
EHA, which proves that Congress did not intend for plaintiffs to circumvent the
EHA’s administrative remedies, “indicates that Congress perceived the EHA as the
most effective vehicle for protecting the constitutional right of a handicapped child to
a public education”).
209
See Miller, supra note 53, at 594.

FINAL_DONNELLY

136

8/25/2016 11:59 AM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:109

remedial provisions of the FLSA. Therefore, the conclusion that
the FLSA is the exclusive remedy and precludes § 1983 claims
should be applied to the ADEA.
CONCLUSION
The split of authority should be resolved in favor of the
ADEA precluding § 1983 claims. The comprehensive remedial
scheme was designed to facilitate resolving issues of age
discrimination in the workplace without having to resort to
litigation. The purpose of the Act, as indicated in its preamble, is
to conciliate and pacify issues through administrative means. By
enabling plaintiffs to bring suits under § 1983, the courts would
be rendering the ADEA practically null and void through
circumvention of the remedial scheme. Thus, the Supreme Court
should follow the Third Circuit’s holding that the ADEA is the
exclusive remedy for employees’ age discrimination claims.

